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House Prices and the Stance of Monetary Policy
Marek Jarocin ´ski and Frank R. Smets
This paper estimates a Bayesian vector autoregression for the U.S. economy that includes a housing
sector and addresses the following questions: Can developments in the housing sector be explained
on the basis of developments in real and nominal gross domestic product and interest rates? What
are the effects of housing demand shocks on the economy? How does monetary policy affect the
housing market? What are the implications of house price developments for the stance of monetary
policy? Regarding the latter question, we implement a Céspedes et al. (2006) version of a monetary
conditions index. (JEL E3 E4)
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shows that the period of exceptionally low short-
term interest rates in 2003 and 2004 (compared
with a Taylor rule) may have substantially con-
tributed to the boom in housing starts and may
have led to an upward spiral of higher house
prices, falling delinquency and foreclosure rates,
more favorable credit ratings and financing con-
ditions, and higher demand for housing. As the
short-term interest rates returned to normal levels,
housing demand fell rapidly, bringing down both
construction and house price inflation. In con-
trast, Mishkin (2007) illustrates the limited ability
of standard models to explain the most recent
housing developments and emphasizes the uncer-
tainty associated with housing-related monetary
transmission channels. He also warns against
leaning against rapidly increasing house prices
over and above their effects on the outlook for
economic activity and inflation and suggests
instead a preemptive easing of policy when a
house price bubble bursts, to avoid a large loss
in economic activity. Even more recently, Kohn
(2007, p. 3) says
T
he current financial turmoil, triggered
by increasing defaults in the subprime
mortgage market in the United States,
has reignited the debate about the effect
of the housing market on the economy at large
and about how monetary policy should respond
to booming house prices.1 Reviewing the role of
housing investment in post-WWII business cycles
in the United States, Leamer (2007, p. 53) con-
cludes that “problems in housing investment
have contributed 26% of the weakness in the
economy in the year before the eight recessions”
and suggests that, in the most recent boom and
bust period, highly stimulative monetary policy
by the Fed first contributed to a booming hous-
ing market and subsequently led to an abrupt
contraction as the yield curve inverted. Similarly,
using counterfactual simulations, Taylor (2007)
1 See the papers presented at the August 30–September 1, 2007,
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City economic symposium Housing,
Housing Finance, and Monetary Policy in Jackson Hole, Wyoming;
http://www.kc.frb.org/home/subwebnav.cfm?level=3&theID=105
48&SubWeb=5. A literature survey is presented in Mishkin (2007).
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Bank of St. Louis.I suspect that, when studies are done with
cooler reflection, the causes of the swing in
house prices will be seen as less a consequence
of monetary policy and more a result of the
emotions of excessive optimism followed by
fear experienced every so often in the market-
place through the ages…Low policy interest
rates early in this decade helped feed the ini-
tial rise in house prices. However, the worst
excesses in the market probably occurred
when short-term interest rates were already
well on their way to more normal levels, but
longer-term rates were held down by a variety
of forces.
In this paper, we review the role of the hous-
ing market and monetary policy in U.S. business
cycles since the second half of the 1980s using an
identified Bayesian vector autoregressive (BVAR)
model. We focus on the past two decades for a
number of reasons. First, following the “Great
Inflation” of the 1970s, inflation measured by the
gross domestic product (GDP) deflator has been
relatively stable between 0 and 4 percent since
the mid-1980s. As discussed by Clarida, Galí, and
Gertler (1999) and many others, this is likely partly
the result of a more systematic monetary policy
approach geared at maintaining price stability.
Second, there is significant evidence that the
volatility of real GDP growth has fallen since 1984
(e.g., McConnell and Pérez-Quirós, 2000). An
important component of this fall in volatility has
been a fall in the volatility of housing investment.
Moreover, Mojon (2007) has shown that a major
contribution to the “Great Moderation” has been
a fall in the correlation between interest rate–
sensitive consumer investment, such as housing
investment, and the other components of GDP.
This suggests that the role of housing investment
in the business cycle may have changed since the
deregulation of the mortgage market in the early
1980s. Indeed, Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel
(2005) find that the interest rate sensitivity of
housing investment has fallen over this period.
We use BVAR to perform three exercises.
First, we analyze the housing boom and bust in
the new millennium using conditional forecasts
by asking this question: Conditional on the esti-
mated model, can we forecast the housing boom
and bust based on observed real GDP, prices, and
short- and long-term interest rate developments?
This is a first attempt at understanding the sources
of the swing in residential construction and house
prices in the new millennium. In the benchmark
VAR, our finding is that housing market develop-
ments can only partially be explained by nominal
and real GDP developments. In particular, the
strong rise in house prices in 2000 and the peak
of house prices in 2006 cannot be explained.
Adding the federal funds rate to the information
set helps forecast the housing boom. Interestingly,
most of the variations in the term spread can also
be explained on the basis of the short-term interest
rate, but there is some evidence of a long-term
interest rate conundrum in 2005 and 2006. As a
result, observing the long-term interest rate also
provides some additional information to explain
the boom in house prices.
Second, using a mixture of zero and sign
restrictions, we identify the effects of housing
demand, monetary policy, and term spread
shocks on the economy. We find that the effects
of housing demand and monetary policy shocks
are broadly in line with the existing empirical
literature. We also analyze whether these shocks
help explain the housing boom and its effect on
the wider economy. We find that both housing
market and monetary policy shocks explain a
significant fraction of the construction and house
price boom, but their effects on overall GDP
growth and inflation are relatively contained.
Finally, in the light of the above findings and
following a methodology proposed by Céspedes
et al. (2006), we explore the use of a monetary
conditions index (MCI), which includes the fed-
eral funds rate, the long-term interest rate spread,
and real house prices, to measure the stance of
monetary policy. The idea of measuring monetary
conditions by taking an appropriate weight of
financial asset prices was pioneered by the Bank
of Canada and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
in the 1990s. As both countries are small open
economies, these central banks worried about how
changes in the value of the exchange rate may
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to construct a weighted index of the short-term
interest rate and the exchange rate, where the
weights reflected the relative effect of those mone-
tary conditions on an intermediate or final target
variable, such as the output gap, output growth,
or inflation. A number of authors have extended
the idea of an MCI to other asset prices, arguing
that those asset prices may be equally or more
important than the exchange rate. A prominent
example is Goodhart and Hofmann (2007), who
argue that real house prices should receive a sig-
nificant weight because of their large effect on the
economy and inflation in particular. In contrast
to this literature, the crucial feature of the MCI
methodology proposed by Céspedes et al. (2006)
is that it takes into account that interest rates and
house prices are endogenous variables that sys-
tematically respond to the state of the economy.
As a result, their MCI can more naturally be inter-
preted as a measure of the monetary policy stance.
Using the identified BVAR, we apply the method-
ology to question whether the rise in house prices
and the fall in long-term interest rates led to an
implicit easing of monetary policy in the United
States.
In the next section, we present two estimated
BVAR specifications. We then use both BVARs
to calculate conditional forecasts of the housing
market boom and bust in the new millennium.
In the third section, we identify housing demand,
monetary policy, and term spread shocks and
investigate their effect on the U.S. economy.
Finally, in the fourth section we develop MCIs and
show using a simple analytical example how the
methodology works and why it is important to
take into account the endogeneity of short- and
long-term interest rates and house prices with
respect to the state of the economy. We then use
the estimated BVARs to address whether long-term
interest rates and house prices play a significant
role in measuring the stance of monetary policy.
A final section contains some conclusions and
discusses some of the shortcomings and areas for
future research.
A BVAR WITH HOUSING FOR
THE U.S. ECONOMY
In this section, we present the results from
estimating a nine-variable BVAR of order five for
the U.S. economy. In addition to standard vari-
ables, such as real GDP, the GDP deflator, com-
modity prices, the federal funds rate, and M2, we
include real consumption, real housing invest-
ment, real house prices, and the long-term interest
rate spread. To measure house price inflation, we
use the nationwide Case-Shiller house price index,
which limits our sample to 1987:Q1-2007:Q2.
The two estimated BVAR specifications are as
follows: One is a traditional VAR in levels (LVAR)
that uses a standard Minnesota prior. The other
is a differences VAR (DVAR) that is specified in
growth rates and uses priors about the steady
state (see Villani, 2008).
More specifically, in the LVAR, the vector of
endogenous variables is given by
(1)
where all variables are in logs, with the exception
of the federal funds rate (it), the long-term interest
rate spread (st), and the housing investment share
of GDP (HIt/Yt); yt is real GDP; ct is real consump-
tion; pt is the GDP deflator; hpt is house prices;
cpt is commodity prices; and mt is the money
stock.3
In the DVAR, the vector of endogenous vari-
ables is instead given by
(2)
where ∆ is the difference operator and the BVAR
is parameterized in terms of deviations from
steady state.
The main difference between the two speci-
fications is related to the assumptions one makes
about the steady state of the endogenous variables.
The advantage of the DVAR with a prior on the
joint steady state is that it guarantees that the
growth rates are reasonable and mutually consis-
tent in the long run, in spite of the short sample
∆∆∆ ∆ ∆∆ ∆ ycp H I Yh p pc p i sm ttttt t t t t t t ￿ / −     ,
ycpH I Yh p pc pism tt t t t t t t tt t ￿ / −    ,
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2 See, for example, Freedman (1994 and 1995a,b) and Duguay (1994).
3 See the data appendix for the sources of the time series.used in the estimation. The cost is that it discards
important sample information contained in the
LVAR variables. As we discuss below, this may
be the main reason behind the larger error bands
around the DVAR impulse responses and condi-
tional projections. Although the forecasts of the
LVAR match the data better at shorter horizons,
the longer-run unconditional forecasts it produces
make less sense from an economic point of view.
Because these considerations may matter for
assessing the monetary policy stance, we report
the findings using both specifications.
In both cases the estimation is Bayesian. In the
case of the DVAR, it involves specifying a prior
on the steady state of the VAR and a Minnesota
prior on dynamic coefficients, as introduced in
Villani (2008). The Minnesota prior uses standard
settings, which are the same as the settings used
for the LVAR. In the DVAR, the informative prior
on the steady state serves two roles: First, it regu-
larizes the inference on the steady states of vari-
ables. Without it, the posterior distribution of
the steady states is ill-specified because of the
singularity at the unit root. Second, and this is
our innovation with respect to the approach of
Villani (2008), through it we use economic theory
to specify prior correlations between steady states.
The steady-state nominal interest rate is, by the
Fisher equation, required to be the sum of the
steady-state inflation rate and the equilibrium
real interest rate. The steady-state real interest
rate is, in turn, required to be equal to the steady-
state output growth rate plus a small error reflect-
ing time preference and a risk premium. The
steady-state output and consumption growth
rates are also correlated a priori, as we think of
them as having a common steady state.
The prior and posterior means and standard
deviations of the steady states in the DVAR are
given in Table 1.
Figure 1 plots the data we use, as well as their
estimated steady-state values from the DVAR. The
steady-state growth rate of real GDP is estimated
to be close to 3 percent over the sample period.
Average GDP deflator inflation is somewhat above
2 percent. The steady-state housing investment–
to-GDP ratio is about 4.5 percent. During the new
millennium construction boom, the ratio rose by
1 percentage point, peaking at 5.5 percent in 2005
before dropping below its long-term average in
the second quarter of 2007. Developments in real
house prices mirror the developments in the con-
struction sector. The estimated steady-state real
growth rate of house prices is 1.5 percent over the
sample period. However, changes in real house
prices were negative during the early-1990s reces-
sion. The growth rate of house prices rose above
average in the late 1990s and accelerated signifi-
cantly above its estimated steady state, reaching
a maximum annual growth rate of more than 10
percent in 2005 before falling abruptly to nega-
tive growth rates in 2006 and 2007. Turning to
interest rate developments, the estimated steady-
state nominal interest rate is around 5 percent.
The estimated steady-state term spread, that is,
the difference between the 10-year bond yield
rate and the federal funds rate, is 1.4 percent. In
the analysis below, we will focus mostly on the
boom and bust period in the housing market
starting in 2000.
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Table 1
Prior and Posterior Means and Standard Deviations of the Steady States in the DVAR
Real GDP Housing House Commodity Federal
Real GDP consumption deflator investment/ price price funds Term Money
Variable growth growth inflation GDP growth growth rate spread growth
Prior mean 2.50 2.50 2.00 4.50 0.00 2.00 4.50 1.00 4.50
Standard deviation 0.50 0.71 0.20 1.00 2.00 2.00 0.62 1.00 1.00
Posterior mean 2.96 3.23 2.21 4.51 1.52 2.00 5.05 1.42 4.35
Standard deviation 0.22 0.22 0.15 0.07 1.08 1.54 0.34 0.24 0.51Using both BVAR specifications, we then ask
the following question: Can we explain develop-
ments in the housing market based on observed
developments in real and nominal GDP and the
short- and long-term interest rates? To answer this
question we make use of the conditional forecast-
ing methodology developed by Doan, Litterman,
and Sims (1984) and Waggoner and Zha (1999).
Figures 2A and 2B report the results for the
DVAR and the LVAR, respectively, focusing on
the post-2000 period. Each figure shows the actual
developments of the housing investment–to-GDP
ratio (first column) and the annual real growth
rate of house prices (second column). Dotted black
lines denote unconditional forecasts, and blue
lines denote conditional forecasts, conditioning
on observed real and nominal GDP (first row),
observed real and nominal GDP and the federal
funds rate (second row), and observed real and
nominal GDP, the federal funds rate, and the term
spread (third row). Note that this is an in-sample
analysis in that the respective VARs are estimated
over the full sample period. The idea behind
increasing the information set is to see to what
extent short- and long-term interest rates provide
information about developments in the housing
Jarocin ´ski and Smets
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Figure 1
Data Used and Their Estimated Steady-State Values from the DVARmarket, in addition to the information already
contained in real and nominal GDP.
A number of interesting observations can be
made. First, as discussed above, the unconditional
forecasts of housing investment and real house
price growth are quite different in both VARs. The
DVAR projects the housing investment–to-GDP
ratio to fluctuate mildly around its steady state,
while the growth rate of house prices is projected
to return quite quickly to its steady state of 1.5
percent from the relatively high level of growth
of more than 5 percent at the end of 1999. The
LVAR instead captures some of the persistent in-
sample fluctuations and projects a further rise in
housing investment and the growth rate of house
prices before it returns close to the sample mean
in 2007.
Second, based on the DVAR in Figure 2A,
neither GDP developments nor short- or long-term
interest rates can explain why real house prices
continued to grow at rates above 5 percent follow-
ing the slowdown of the economy in 2000 and
2001. Real and nominal GDP developments can
explain an important fraction of the housing boom
in 2002 and 2003, but they cannot account for the
10 percent acceleration of house prices in 2004
Jarocin ´ski and Smets
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Figure 2A
Housing Investment–to-GDP Ratio and Annual House Price Growth Rate, 1995-2007: Actual
Data and Unconditional and Conditional Forecasts from the DVARand 2005. The low level of short- and long-term
interest rates in 2004 and 2005 helps explain the
boom in those years. In particular, toward the end
of 2004 and in 2005, the unusually low level of
long-term interest rates helps account for the accel-
eration in house prices. According to this model,
there is some evidence of a conundrum: In this
period, long-term interest rates are lower than
would be expected on the basis of observed short-
term interest rates. The ability to better forecast
the boom period comes, however, at the expense
of a larger unexplained undershooting of house
prices and housing investment toward the end of
the sample. Overall, these results suggest that
the unusually low level of short- and long-term
interest rates may have contributed to the boom
in U.S. housing markets in the new millennium.
Third, the LVAR results in Figure 2B are, how-
ever, less clear. The part of the housing boom that
cannot be explained by developments in real
and nominal GDP is smaller. Moreover, adding
short- and long-term interest rates to the data set
does not change the picture very significantly.
Thesefindingssuggestthattheresultsofthisanaly-
sis partly depend on the assumed steady-state
behavior of the housing market and interest rates.
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Housing Investment–to-GDP Ratio and Annual House Price Growth Rate, 1995-2007: Actual
Data and Unconditional and Conditional Forecasts from the LVARIDENTIFYING HOUSING
DEMAND, MONETARY POLICY,
AND TERM SPREAD SHOCKS
To add a bit more structure to the analysis, in
this section we identify housing demand, mone-
tary policy, and term spread shocks and analyze
their effect on the economy. We use a mixture of
a recursive identification scheme and sign restric-
tions. As usual, monetary policy shocks are identi-
fied by zero restrictions. They are assumed to
affect economic activity and prices with a one-
quarter lag, but they may have an immediate
effect on the term spread and the money stock.
The housing demand shock is a shock that affects
housing investment and house prices contempo-
raneously and in the same direction. Moreover,
its immediate effect on output is roughly equal
to the increase in housing investment (i.e., this
shock has no contemporaneous effect on the other
components of output taken together).
We use sign restrictions to impose this identi-
fication scheme.4 For simplicity, we also assume
that the housing demand shock affects the GDP
deflator only with a lag. The shock that affects
housing investment and house prices in opposite
directions can be interpreted as a housing supply
shock. However, it turns out that this shock
explains only a small fraction of developments
in the housing market, so we will not explicitly
discuss this shock. Figure 3 shows for the DVAR
(shaded areas) and the LVAR (dotted lines) the
68 percent posterior probability regions of the
estimated impulses.
A number of observations are worth making.
Overall, both VAR specifications give similar esti-
mated impulse response functions. One difference
worth noting is that, relative to the LVAR specifi-
cation, the DVAR incorporates larger and more
persistent effects on house prices and the GDP
deflator. In what follows, we focus on the more
precisely estimated LVAR specification. According
to Figure 3, a one-standard-deviation housing
demand shock leads to a persistent rise in real
house prices of about 0.75 percent and an increase
in the housing investment share of about 0.05 per-
centage points. The effect on the overall economy
is for real GDP to rise by about 0.10 percent after
four quarters, whereas the effect on the GDP
deflator takes longer (about three years) to peak
at 0.08 percent above baseline. Note that, in the
DVAR specification, the peak effect on goods
prices is quite a bit larger. The monetary policy
response as captured by the federal funds rate is
initially limited, but eventually the federal funds
rate increases by about 20 basis points after two
years. The initial effect on the term spread is posi-
tive, reflecting that long-term interest rates rise
in anticipation of inflation and a rise in short-
term rates.
To assess how reasonable these quantitative
effects are, it is useful to compare them with other
empirical results. One relevant literature is the
empirical literature on the size of wealth/collateral
effects of housing on consumption. As discussed
in Muellbauer (2007) and Mishkin (2007), the
empirical results are somewhat diverse, but some
of the more robust findings suggest that the wealth
effects from housing are approximately twice as
large as those from stock prices. For example,
Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2006) estimate that
the long-run marginal propensity to consume out
of a dollar increase in housing is 9 cents, compared
with 4 cents for non-housing wealth. Similarly,
using cross-country time series, Slacalek (2006)
finds that it is 7 cents out of a dollar. Overall, the
long-run marginal propensities to consume out
of housing wealth range from 5 to 17 percent, but
a reasonable median estimate is probably around
7 to 8 percent compared with a 5 percent elasticity
for stock market wealth. How does this compare
with the elasticities embedded in our estimated
impulse response to a housing price shock? A1
percent persistent increase in real house prices
leads to a 0.075 percent increase in real consump-
tion after four quarters. Taking into account that
the housing wealth–to-consumption ratio is
around 3 in the United States, this suggests a
marginal propensity to consume about one-third
of the long-run median estimate reported above.
This lower effect on consumption may partly be
explained by the fact that the increase in house
prices is temporary. The mean elasticities embed-
ded in the DVAR are somewhat lower.
4 For a discussion of VAR identification with sign restrictions, see,
for example, Uhlig (2005).
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responses with simulations in Mishkin (2007)
that use the Federal Reserve Bank U.S. (FRB/US)
model. Mishkin (2007, Figure 5) reports that a 20
percent decline in real house prices under the
estimated Taylor rule leads to a 1.5 percent devi-
ation of real GDP from baseline in a version of the
FRB/US with magnified channels, and to only a
bit more than 0.5 percent in the benchmark ver-
sion (which excludes an effect on real housing
investment). Translating our results to a 20 per-
cent real house price shock suggests a multiplier
of 2.5 percent. This multiplier is quite a bit higher
than that suggested by the FRB/US simulations,
but in our case this may be partly the result of
the strong immediate response of housing
investment.
Finally, we can also compare the estimated
impulse responses of Figure 3 with the impulse
responses to a positive housing preference shock
in the estimated structural DSGE model of the
U.S. economy in Iacoviello and Neri (2007).
They find that a 1 percent persistent increase in
real house prices is associated with a 0.07 per-
cent increase in consumption and a 3.6 percent
increase in real housing investment. Whereas our
estimated elasticity of real consumption is very
similar, the elasticity of real housing investment
Jarocin ´ski and Smets
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Figure 3
Impulse Responses to a Housing Demand Shock, DVAR and LVARis quite a bit lower at approximately 1.5 percent.
It falls at the lower bound of the findings of Topel
and Rosen (1988), who estimate that, for every 1
percent increase in house prices lasting for two
years, new construction increases on impact
between 1.5 and 3.15 percent, depending on the
specifications.
Turning to a monetary policy shock, the LVAR
results in Figure 4 show that a persistent 25-basis-
point tightening of the federal funds rate has the
usual delayed negative effects on real GDP and the
GDP deflator. The size of the real GDP response
is quite small, with a maximum mean negative
effect of about 0.1 percent deviation from base-
line after three years. This effect is even smaller
and less significant in the DVAR specification.
For the LVAR specification, the effect on housing
investment is larger and quicker, with a maxi-
mum negative effect of 0.03 percentage points of
GDP (which would correspond to approximately
0.75 percent change) after about two years. Real
house prices also immediately start falling and
bottom out at 0.5 percent below baseline after
two and a half years. The housing market effects
are somewhat stronger in the DVAR specifica-
tion. The higher sensitivity of housing invest-
ment to a monetary policy shock is consistent
with the findings in the literature. For example,
Jarocin ´ski and Smets
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Impulse Responses to a Monetary Policy Shock, DVAR and LVARusing identified VARs, Erceg and Levin (2002)
find that housing investment is about 10 times as
responsive as consumption to a monetary policy
shock. Our results are also comparable with those
reported in Mishkin (2007) using the FRB/US
model. In those simulations, a 100-basis-point
increase in the federal funds rate leads to a fall
in real GDP of about 0.3 to 0.4 percent, although
the lags (6 to 8 quarters) are somewhat smaller
than those in our estimated BVARs. Further, the
effect on real housing investment is faster (within
a year) and larger, but the estimated magnitude
of these effects (between 1 and 1.25 percent) is
quite a bit larger in our case (around 2.5 percent).
Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2005) argue that
the interest rate sensitivity of real housing invest-
ment has fallen since the second half of the 1980s
(partly the result of deregulation of the mortgage
market in the early 1980s). Our results suggest
elasticities that are more in line with Erceg and
Levin (2002) than with the FRB/US simulations.
Our results can also be compared with the
impulse responses to an adverse interest rate
shock in Iacoviello and Neri (2007). They find
that a 50-basis-point temporary increase in the
federal funds rate leads to a fall in real house
prices of about 0.75 percent from baseline, com-
pared with a delayed 1 percent fall in real house
Jarocin ´ski and Smets
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Impulse Responses to a Term Spread Shock, DVAR and LVARJarocin ´ski and Smets
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Table 2A
Shares of Housing Demand, Monetary Policy, and Term Spread Shocks in Variance
Decompositions, DVAR
Horizon
Variable Shock 03 11 23
Output Housing 0.016 0.034 0.052 0.062
Monetary policy 0.000 0.004 0.021 0.039
Term premium 0.000 0.003 0.015 0.028
Consumption Housing 0.005 0.018 0.033 0.055
Monetary policy 0.000 0.003 0.015 0.029
Term premium 0.000 0.005 0.034 0.063
Prices Housing 0.002 0.013 0.120 0.166
Monetary policy 0.000 0.003 0.014 0.037
Term premium 0.000 0.006 0.034 0.046
Housing investment Housing 0.521 0.579 0.382 0.291
Monetary policy 0.000 0.015 0.175 0.136
Term premium 0.000 0.005 0.023 0.062
House prices Housing 0.535 0.554 0.410 0.242
Monetary policy 0.000 0.010 0.068 0.083
Term premium 0.000 0.002 0.021 0.060
Commodity prices Housing 0.027 0.028 0.041 0.085
Monetary Policy 0.000 0.012 0.167 0.222
Term premium 0.000 0.004 0.018 0.055
Interest rate Housing 0.037 0.061 0.165 0.178
Monetary policy 0.752 0.496 0.192 0.166
Term premium 0.000 0.023 0.076 0.088
Spread Housing 0.090 0.050 0.177 0.186
Monetary policy 0.223 0.303 0.214 0.206
Term premium 0.336 0.245 0.146 0.134
Money Housing 0.060 0.044 0.062 0.099
Monetary policy 0.204 0.141 0.044 0.045
Term premium 0.013 0.042 0.129 0.135
NOTE: The reported shares are averages over the posterior distribution and relate to the (log) level variables.Jarocin ´ski and Smets
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Table 2B
Shares of Housing Demand, Monetary Policy, and Term Spread Shocks in Variance
Decompositions, LVAR
Horizon
Variable Shock 03 11 23
Output Housing 0.019 0.049 0.073 0.106
Monetary policy 0.000 0.005 0.036 0.052
Term premium 0.000 0.005 0.026 0.026
Consumption Housing 0.005 0.021 0.051 0.093
Monetary policy 0.000 0.008 0.040 0.051
Term premium 0.000 0.005 0.021 0.024
Prices Housing 0.002 0.017 0.127 0.153
Monetary policy 0.000 0.005 0.038 0.114
Term premium 0.000 0.005 0.012 0.016
Housing investment Housing 0.582 0.554 0.357 0.351
Monetary policy 0.000 0.027 0.124 0.125
Term premium 0.000 0.015 0.021 0.019
House prices Housing 0.586 0.610 0.360 0.229
Monetary policy 0.000 0.011 0.087 0.066
Term premium 0.000 0.003 0.010 0.014
Commodity prices Housing 0.030 0.044 0.154 0.149
Monetary policy 0.000 0.008 0.072 0.100
Term premium 0.000 0.005 0.012 0.015
Interest rate Housing 0.032 0.055 0.217 0.211
Monetary policy 0.709 0.453 0.206 0.177
Term premium 0.000 0.007 0.018 0.018
Spread Housing 0.072 0.048 0.129 0.150
Monetary policy 0.230 0.281 0.163 0.152
Term premium 0.355 0.215 0.114 0.085
Money Housing 0.040 0.036 0.053 0.066
Monetary policy 0.257 0.237 0.089 0.060
Term premium 0.015 0.020 0.021 0.025
NOTE: The reported shares are averages over the posterior distribution and relate to the (log) level variables.prices in our case (the delay is partly the result
of our recursive identification assumption).
According to the estimates of Iacoviello and Neri
(2007), real investment responds six times more
strongly than real consumption and two times
more strongly than real fixed investment. Overall,
this is consistent with our results. However, the
effects in Iacoviello and Neri (2007) are immediate,
whereas they are delayed in our case. (See also
Del Negro and Otrok, 2007.)
In conclusion, the overall quantitative esti-
mates of the effects of a monetary policy shock
are in line with those found in the empirical lit-
erature. Similarly to our results, Goodhart and
Hofmann (2007) find that a one-standard-deviation
shock to the real short-term interest rate has about
the same quantitative effect on the output gap as
a one-standard-deviation shock to the real house
price gap.
Finally, in the light of the discussion of the
effects of developments in long-term interest rates
on the house price boom and bust in the United
States and many other countries, it is also inter-
esting to look at the effects of a term spread shock
Jarocin ´ski and Smets
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Figure 6A, Panel 1
Counterfactuals, Shutting Down Each of the Identified Shocks, DVARon the housing market. Figure 5 shows that a 20-
basis-point increase in long-term interest rates
over the federal funds rate has a quite significant
effect on housing investment, which drops by
more than 0.014 percentage points of GDP (which
corresponds to a 0.3 percent change) after about
a year. Also, real GDP falls with a bit more of a
delay, by about 0.075 percent after six quarters.
Both the GDP deflator and real house prices fall,
but only gradually. Overall, the size of the impulse
responses is, however, small.
Tables 2A and 2B report the contribution of
the three shocks to the forecast-error variance at
different horizons in both specifications. Overall,
the housing demand, monetary policy, and term
spread shocks account for only a small fraction
of the total variance in real GDP and in the GDP
deflator. Monetary policy and housing demand
shocks do, however, account for a significant
fraction of the variance in the housing market.
This can be verified by looking at the contri-
bution of the three shocks to the historical boom
and bust episode since 2000, as depicted in
Jarocin ´ski and Smets
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Figure 6A, Panel 2
Counterfactuals, Shutting Down Each of the Identified Shocks, DVARFigure 6A for the DVAR and 6B for the LVAR.
Panel 1 of each figure shows the developments
of the real housing investment–to-GDP ratio (first
column) and the annual change in real house
prices (second column). Panel 2 of each figure
shows output (first column), prices (second col-
umn), and interest rates (third column). Each
graph includes the actual data (black lines), uncon-
ditional forecasts as of 2000 (black dotted lines),
and the counterfactual evolution (blue dashed
lines) when each of the following three identified
shocks are put to zero: a housing demand shock
(first row), monetary policy shock (second row),
and term spread shock (third row).
For the DVAR (Figure 6A), the term spread
shock does not have a visible effect on the housing
market or the economy as a whole. The housing
demand shock has a large positive effect on the
housing market in 2001 and 2002 and again in
2004 and 2005. A negative demand shock also
explains a large fraction of the fall in construction
and house price growth from 2006 onward. These
shocks have only negligible effects on overall GDP
growth, but do seem to have pushed up inflation
Jarocin ´ski and Smets
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Figure 6B, Panel 1
Counterfactuals, Shutting Down Each of the Identified Shocks, LVARby 10 to 20 basis points over most of the post-2000
period. Loose monetary policy also seems to have
contributed to the housing boom in 2004 and 2005.
Without the relatively easy policy of late 2003 and
early 2004, the boom in house price growth would
have stayed well below the 10 percent growth rate
in2005.Easymonetarypolicyalsohasanoticeable,
though small effect, on GDP growth and inflation.
The LVAR results depicted in Figure 6B give
similar indications, although they generally attrib-
ute an even larger role to the housing demand
shocks.
HOUSE PRICES AND THE
MONETARY POLICY STANCE
IN THE UNITED STATES
The idea of measuring monetary conditions
by taking an appropriate weight of interest rates
and asset prices was pioneered by the Bank of
Canada and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in
the 1990s. Because both countries are small open
economies, these central banks worried about
how changes in the value of the exchange rate
Jarocin ´ski and Smets
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Figure 6B, Panel 2
Counterfactuals, Shutting Down Each of the Identified Shocks, LVARmay affect the monetary policy stance.5 The idea
was to construct a weighted index of the short-
term interest rate and the exchange rate, where
the weights reflected the relative effect of the
exchange rate on an intermediate or final target
variable, such as the output gap, output growth,
or inflation. A number of authors have extended
the idea of the MCI to other asset prices, arguing
that those asset prices may be equally or more
important than the exchange rate. One prominent
example is Goodhart and Hofmann (2007), who
argue that real house prices should receive a sig-
nificant weight in an MCI because of their signif-
icant effect on the economy. For the United States,
they argue that the relative weight of the short-term
interest rate versus house prices should be of the
order of 0.6 to 1.8.
In the small literature that developed following
the introduction of the MCI concept, a number
of shortcomings have been highlighted.6 One
difficulty is that the lag structure of the effects of
changes in the interest rate and real house prices
on the economy may be different. As noted above,
according to our estimates, the effect of an interest
rate shock on economic activity appears to take
somewhat longer than the effect of a house price
shock. In response, Batini and Turnbull (2002;BT)
proposed a dynamic MCI that takes into account
the different lag structures by weighting all current
and past interest rates and asset prices with their
estimated impulse responses. Another shortcom-
ing of the standard MCI is that it is very difficult
to interpret the MCI as an indicator of the mone-
tary policy stance, because it does not take into
account that changes in monetary conditions will
typically be endogenous to the state of the econ-
omy. The implicit assumption of the standard MCI
is that the monetary conditions are driven by
exogenous shocks. This is clearly at odds with
the identified VAR literature that suggests that
most of the movements in monetary conditions
are in response to the state of the economy. For
example, changes in the federal funds rate will
be typically in response to changing economic
conditions and a changing outlook for price sta-
bility. An alternative way of expressing this draw-
back is that the implicit benchmark against which
the MCI is measured does not depend on the likely
source of the shocks in the economy. As a result,
the benchmark in the standard MCI does not
depend on the state of the economy, although
clearly for given objectives the optimal MCI will
vary with the shocks to the economy. A third
shortcoming is that often the construction of an
MCI does not take into account that the estimated
weight of its various components is subject to
uncertainty and estimation error. This uncertainty
needs to be taken into account when interpreting
the significance of apparent changes in monetary
conditions. The methodology developed by
Céspedes et al. (CLMM; 2006) addresses each of
these shortcomings.
In this section, we apply a version of the
MCI proposed by CLMM to derive a measure of
the monetary policy stance that takes into account
movements in the short- and long-term interest
rates and in real house prices. Using this index,
we try to answer this question: Did the rise in
house prices and the fall in long-term interest
rates since 2000 lead to an implicit easing of
monetary policy in the United States? We use
the BVARs estimated in the previous section to
implement the methodology. In the next sub-
section, we define the MCI and use a simple
analytical example to illustrate its logic. Next,
we apply it to the U.S. economy using the esti-
mated BVARs.
An MCI in a VAR: Methodology and
Intuition
For the sake of example, let the economy be
described by a stationary VAR of order one:
(3)
where Xt is the vector of nonpolicy variables,
such as output and inflation, and Pt is the vector
of monetary policy and financial variables, which
in our case are the short-term interest rate, the
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5 See, for example, Freedman (1994 and 1995a,b) and Duguay
(1994).
6 See, for example, Gerlach and Smets (2000).price index. As in BT, a standard dynamic MCI
with respect to a target variable j can then be
defined as
(4)
where Sj is a selection vector that selects the target
variable j from the list of non-policy variables.
Typically, the target variable in the construction
of an MCI is either output growth or the output
gap. This is based on the notion that financial and
monetary conditions affect inflation primarily
through their effect on spending and output.
However, inflation can be used as a target vari-
able also. In this paper, we will present results for
both output growth and inflation as target vari-
ables. The parameter H is the time period over
which lags of the monetary conditions are con-
sidered. P*
t–s is typically given by the steady state
of the monetary conditions. In our case, this
would be the equilibrium nominal interest rate,
the steady-state term spread, and steady-state real
house price growth rate. Alternatively, it could
also be given by the monetary conditions that
would have been expected as of period t–H, if
there had been no shocks from period t–H to t.
Equation (2) illustrates that the standard MCI is
a weighted average of the deviations of current
and past policy variables from their steady-state
values, where the weights are determined by the
partial elasticity of output with respect to a change
in the policy variable.
As discussed above, a problem with this
notion of the MCI is that the policy variables
are treated as exogenous and independent from
the underlying economic conditions, or, alterna-
tively, they are assumed to be driven by exoge-
nous shocks. As a result, it is very problematic to
interpret this index as a measure of the monetary
policy stance. For example, it may easily be the
case that the policy rate rises above its steady-
state value because of positive demand shocks.
In this case, monetary policy may either be too
loose, neutral, or too tight, depending on whether
the higher interest rate is able to offset the effect
of the demand shocks only partially, fully, or
more than fully. Instead, the standard MCI will















always indicate that monetary conditions have
tightened.
In contrast to the standard MCI, the alternative
MCI proposed by CLMM does take into account
the endogeneity of the policy instruments. In this
case the MCI is defined as
(5)
The first part is the same as in the standard
case (equation (4)), but the second part adds the
effect of shocks that are most consistent with the
observed path of monetary conditions. More
specifically, the shocks are drawn from their dis-
tribution, subject to the restriction that they gen-
erate the observed path of monetary conditions.
Doan et al. (1984) and Waggoner and Zha (1999)
show that the mean of this constrained distribu-




stacked is a vector of stacked shocks over
period H, R is a stacked matrix of impulse
response coefficients of the monetary conditions
with respect to the shocks, and P – E[P] is the
vector of correspondingly stacked forecast errors
associated with the observed or assumed monetary
conditions over the same period H.
To understand the intuition for why the MCI
by CLMM is a potentially much better indicator
of the stance of monetary policy, it is useful to go
through a simple static analytical example.





where yt is the target variable, say, output growth,
st, is the short-term policy rate, ht is real house
prices, and there are three shocks: an output shock,
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reflects the dependence of output on the monetary
conditions and an output shock. For convenience,
we have in this case assumed that there are no
lags in the transmission process. Equation (8) is
a monetary policy reaction function, and equation
(9) shows how house prices depend on the short
rate and a shock.
In this case, the standard MCI (as in BT) is
given by
(10)
and is independent of the monetary policy reac-
tion function. If α1 is negative and α2 is positive,
a rise in house prices will lead to an easing of
monetary conditions unless the short-term interest
rate rises to exactly offset the effect of house prices
on the target variable.
In contrast, the MCI of CLMM is given by
(11)
where we have assumed that all variables are
measured as deviations from the steady state. As
in equation (6), the mean output shock needs to be
consistent with the observed short-term interest
rate and real house prices.
Next, we derive that the expression of the last
term in equation (11) is a function of the interest
rate and house prices. From equations (6) and (7),
it is clear that the relation between the interest
rate conditions and the shocks is given by
(12)
As discussed above, given a joint standard
normal distribution of the shocks, the mean of
the shocks conditional on the observed interest
rates is given by
(13)
where R is given in equation (12).
To simplify even further, assume that β3 = 0,
that is, there is no policy shock. In this case, there
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is a one-to-one relationship between the shocks
and the observed interest rate and house prices,
given by
(14)
As a result, the MCI of CLMM is given by
(15)
Comparing expressions (15) and (10), it is
obvious that the MCIs of BT and CLMM have
different weights on the short-term interest rate
and house prices. The weights in the MCI of
CLMM depend not only on the partial elasticities
of output with respect to the short-term interest
rate and house prices, but also on the coefficients
in the policy reaction function and the elasticity
of house prices with respect to the short-term
interest rate.
To see why the MCI of CLMM is a better indi-
cator of the monetary policy stance, it is useful to
investigate how the weights in (15) will depend
on systematic policy behavior. From equations
(7) and (9), one can easily show that, if the central
bank targets output growth, the optimal interest
rate reaction function is given by
(16)
If the interest rate elasticity of output is neg-
ative (α1 < 0) and elasticity with respect to house
prices is positive (α2 < 0), then a central bank try-
ing to stabilize output will lean against positive
output and house price shocks, where the size
of the reaction coefficient will depend on the
strength and the channels of the transmission
mechanism.
Substituting the coefficients β1 and β2 in (15)
with the coefficients in expression (16), it can be
verified that the MCI of CLMM will be equal to
zero. In other words, a policy that stabilizes out-
put will be seen as a neutral policy according to
this index. In contrast, it is obvious that such a
ε
ε
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affect the standard MCI.
Instead, assume that the central bank reacts
optimally to the output shock, as in equation (13),
but does not respond to the shock to house prices
(β2 = 0). In this case, it can be shown that the MCI
of CLMM is given by
(17)
This result is very intuitive: When the central
bank does not respond to house price shocks
and a rise in house prices has a stimulative effect
on output, the MCI of CLMM will indicate easy
monetary conditions whenever there is a positive
shock to house prices.
This simple example makes it clear that, in
order to have a meaningful indicator of the mone-
tary policy stance, it is important to realize that
the monetary conditions endogenously reflect
all shocks that hit the economy.
An Application to House Prices and
the Policy Stance in the United States
Obviously, the static example is too simple
to bring to the data. In reality, monetary conditions
will have lagged effects on output and inflation
and the lag patterns may differ across the various
components, as shown earlier. In this section,
we use the two specifications of the BVAR—the
LVAR and the DVAR—to calculate MCIs for the
U.S. economy. Consistent with the MCI literature,
we use real GDP growth and inflation as the target
variables. Moreover, to take into account the lags
in the transmission process of monetary policy
that we documented in the third section, we
assume that real GDP growth is expected annual
GDP growth one year ahead, whereas inflation
is expected annual inflation two years ahead.
Figures 7A and 7B show the results of this exer-
cise. To illustrate the effect of taking endogeneity
of the indicators of stance into account, we also
compare the MCI of CLMM (which incorporates
the full set of shocks) with the MCI of BT. In the
latter case, we assume that the observed interest
rates and house prices are driven by only the
three exogenous shocks identified in the third
section.
MCI h s CLMM t t t t
h
, . = − () = αδ α ε 2 2
Figure 7A shows for the DVAR and 7B for
the LVAR the estimated 68 percent probability
regions for the MCI of CLMM (blue dotted lines)
and the MCI of BT (gray shaded areas) based on
one-year-ahead annual output growth (left col-
umn) and two-year-ahead annual inflation (right
column) using the following indicators of mone-
tary conditions: the federal funds rate (first row);
the federal funds rate and the term spread (sec-
ond row); and the federal funds rate, the term
spread, and real house prices (third row). The
MCIs shown are basically the difference between
the conditional forecast of the target variable
based on the actual path of the chosen indicators
of stance and the unconditional forecast of the
target variable.
A few observations are worth making on the
basis of Figure 7A. First, overall, the MCI with
expected output growth as a target variable and
the MCI with inflation as the target variable give
similar indications about stance. Financial con-
ditions were relatively tight in 2000-01, then
gradually became relatively loose in 2002-05
before turning tight again during 2006. Second,
the uncertainty surrounding the MCIs is very high.
Based on standard significance levels, the mone-
tary conditions were not significantly different
from neutral during the whole period. Third,
taking house prices into account (third row of
Figure 7A) does seem to matter for measuring
the monetary policy stance. More specifically,
buoyant growth in house prices in 2004 and 2005
suggests that monetary policy was relatively loose
in this period, whereas it turned tight in 2007.
During the housing boom, easy monetary condi-
tions implied two-year-ahead annual inflation
that was more than 0.5 percentage points above
its steady state. Most recently, tight conditions
imply expected inflation almost 0.5 percentage
points below the target. These results differ mar-
ginally when the LVAR specification is used (com-
pare Figure 7B with 7A).
In Figure 7B, a comparison of the 68 percent
posterior probability regions for the MCI of CLMM
(blue dotted lines) with those for the MCI of BT
(shaded areas) reveals that, although the broad
messages of the estimated MCIs are similar, con-
ditioning on the three identified exogenous shocks
Jarocin ´ski and Smets
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This is partly because these exogenous shocks
contribute only to a limited degree to the fore-
cast variance of output and inflation. As a result,
the effects are also less precisely estimated. The
point estimates are similar, which suggests that
the developments in 2002-05 were strongly
influenced by the policy and housing demand
shocks and not much by the responses to other
shocks.
As explained earlier, the MCIs are a weighted
average of current and past levels of the short-
term interest rate, the term spread (or the long-
term interest rate), and real house price growth.
To show the relative importance of the three com-
ponents, Table 3 gives the sum of the weights on
current and past (up-to-8-quarter) lagged values
of each. As in Figure 7A, using annual GDP and
inflation as target variable, the MCIs of CLMM
and BT are, respectively, calculated based on the
short-term interest rate (the first panel); the short-
and long-term interest rates (the second panel);
and the short- and long-term interest rates, and
real house price growth (the third panel). A few
Jarocin ´ski and Smets
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MCIs of CLMM and BT, DVARJarocin ´ski and Smets
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MCIs of CLMM and BT, LVAR
Table 3
8-Quarter Sum of MCI Weights, DVAR
MCIi MCIi,s MCIi,s,hp–p
Short rate (i) Short rate Long rate (s) Short rate Long rate House prices (hp–p)
CLMM-GDP –0.162 –0.201 0.090 –0.198 0.102 0.000
BT-GDP –0.198 –0.190 0.074 –0.194 0.102 0.003
CLMM-Inflation –0.046 –0.142 0.162 –0.148 0.250 0.056
BT-Inflation –0.154 –0.182 0.168 –0.087 0.180 0.083observations are noteworthy. First, taking only
the short-term interest rate as an indicator of
the policy stance, it is clear that on average an
observed increase in the interest rate above its
steady-state value indicates a restrictive policy
stance with respect to both GDP growth and infla-
tion. This is, in particular, the case when the
short-term interest rate is assumed to be driven
by the three identified exogenous shocks (as in
the MCI of BT). However, if the full endogenous
nature of the nominal interest rate is taken into
account (as in the MCI of CLMM), this is less the
case and more so for inflation than for growth.
The reason is that, because of the central bank’s
reaction function, the short-term interest rate is
likely to increase in response to shocks that drive
up future GDP growth and inflation. In this case,
a rise in interest rates may even suggest an easing
of the policy stance if interest rates do not rise
enough to offset the pickup in growth and infla-
tion. To the extent that changes in the nominal
interest rate reflect higher inflation and inflation
expectations, this argument is particularly strong
when expected inflation is the target.
In the second panel of Table 3, adding the
long-term interest rate slightly changes the picture.
Keeping the long-term interest rate constant,
observing a 1-percentage-point increase in the
short-term interest rate for 8 quarters signals a
fall in GDP growth of about 20 basis points over
the next year and a fall in inflation of somewhat
less over the next two years. In contrast, keeping
the short-term rate constant, a rise in the long-
term interest rate by 1 percentage point signals
lax monetary policy, as it predicts a rise in both
GDP growth (up to 9 basis points) and inflation
(up to 16 basis points) above steady state.
Finally, the far-right panel of Table 3 shows
the weights when real house prices are included
in the MCIs also. Their addition has little effect
on the weights on interest rates. The upper rows
show that the weight on real house price growth
is close to zero when the target variable is GDP
growth. This is indeed similar to the results in
Figure 7A, which show that the actual MCIs do
not change very much. However, when annual
inflation over two years is the target variable,
there is a significant weight on house prices: A
5-percentage-point rise in the growth rate of real
house prices signals a 30- to 40-basis-point rise
in annual inflation According to the weights, such
a rise in house prices would call for a substan-
tially higher short-term rate (of about 2 percent-
age points) in order to have neutral monetary
conditions.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we examine the role of housing
investment and house prices in U.S. business
cycles since the second half of the 1980s using
an identified Bayesian VAR. We find that housing
demand shocks have significant effects on hous-
ing investment and house prices, but overall these
shocks have had only a limited effect on the per-
formance of the U.S. economy in terms of aggregate
growth and inflation in line with the empirical
literature. There is also evidence that monetary
policy has significant effects on housing invest-
ment and house prices and that easy monetary
policy designed to stave off perceived risks of
deflation in 2002-04 has contributed to the boom
in the housing market in 2004 and 2005. How-
ever, again, the effect on the overall economy was
limited. A counterfactual simulation suggests
that without those policy shocks inflation would
have been about 25 basis points lower at the end
of 2006.
In order to examine the effect of house prices
on monetary conditions, we implement a method-
ology proposed by Céspedes et al. (2006). This
methodology consists of calculating the forecast
of a target variable (expected GDP growth or
expected inflation) conditional on the observed
path of monetary conditions, including the short-
term interest rates, the term spread, and house
prices. We show that, in spite of the endogeneity
of house prices to both the state of the economy
and the level of interest rates, taking house prices
into account may sharpen the inference about the
stance of monetary policy. Given the uncertainty
about the sources of business cycle fluctuations
and the effect of the various shocks (including
housing demand shocks) on the economy, uncer-
tainty regarding the stance of monetary policy
Jarocin ´ski and Smets
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ment of house prices into account, there is some
indication that monetary conditions may have
been too loose in 2004 and were relatively tight
in the summer of 2007.
Various caveats regarding the methodology
we use in this paper are worth mentioning. First,
all the analysis presented in this paper is in-
sample and ex post. Although this is helpful in
trying to understand past developments, this does
not prove the methodology is sufficient for real-
time analysis. For this we need to extend the
analysis to a real-time context. Second, the sta-
tistical model we use to interpret the U.S. housing
market and business cycle is basically a linear
one. It has been argued that costly asset price
booms and busts are fundamentally of an asym-
metric nature. Our linear methodology is not able
to handle such nonlinearities. Third, the robust-
ness of the analysis to different identification
schemes for the structural shocks needs to be
further examined. We hope to shed light on some
of these issues in further analysis.
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Real GDP: real GDP, 3 decimal (GDPC96), seasonally adjusted annual rate, quarterly, billions of chained
2000 dollars.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) data from Federal
Reserve Economic Data (FRED; http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/).
Real consumption: real personal consumption expenditures (PCECC96), seasonally adjusted annual rate,
quarterly, billions of chained 2000 dollars.
SOURCE: BEA data from FRED.
GDP deflator: GDP: implicit price deflator (GDPDEF), seasonally adjusted, quarterly, index 2000 = 100.
SOURCE: BEA data from FRED.
Federal funds rate: effective federal funds rate (FEDFUNDS), monthly, percent, averages of daily figures.
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System data from FRED (averaged over 3 months
of the quarter).
Long-term interest rate: 10-year Treasury constant maturity rate (GS10), monthly, percent, averages of
business days.
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System data from FRED (averaged over 3 months
of the quarter).
S&P/Case-Shiller U.S. National Home Price Index: quarterly, based on repeated sales.
SOURCE: http://www.standardandpoors.com, available since 1987.
M2: M2 money stock (M2NS), not seasonally adjusted, monthly, billions of dollars.
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System data from FRED (averaged over 3 months
of the quarter).
Real private residential fixed investment: 3 Decimal, (PRFIC96), seasonally adjusted annual rate,
quarterly, billions of chained 2000 dollars.
SOURCE: BEA data from FRED.
Commodity price index: Dow Jones spot average, quarterly.
SOURCE: Global Financial Data; www.globalfinancialdata.com.
In the VAR, we use the interest rate spread, computed as the difference between the long interest rate
and the federal funds rate, house prices deflated relative to the GDP deflator, and the ratio of real pri-
vate residential fixed investment to real GDP. All the variables, except for the short-term interest rate,
spread, and housing investment, enter either in log levels or log differences (annualized), depending
on the VAR specification indicated.
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